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ABSTRACT
Battle management decision making requires a composite picture of the
environment, including identification of moving and stationary "targets". The current
state of technology allows large volumes of data to be gathered from multiple sources.
Target kinematics and identity features must be derived through fusion of the data.
Initial assignment and maintenance of track numbers, the identifying labels, may lead to
ambiguity in command and control information management. The problem is discussed
in terms of data fusion in a multiple sensor environment, giving particular emphasis to
managing track ED numbers in representative architectures. An overview of data fusion
provides a framework for the problem of track ID's. A Centralized Architecture,
Distributed Architecture, and two Hybrid Architectures are developed focusing on design
tradeoffs. System evaluation using the Analytic Hierarchy Process furnishes the reader
an illustration of a process which might be used to select an optimal architecture. This
research does not attempt to propose a specific design, but identifies several key criteria
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I. INTRODUCTION
Information management is critical to the command and control of today's fighting
forces. Doctrine must be cunning and state of the art technology integrated, to meet the
challenge of the future. In the environment of real time weapons control, sensor
information must be processed with the same speed. The decision-maker is faced with
the requirement for almost instantaneous processing of high volume data. This
environment demands an organizational and architectural structure that will enhance
automation of decision processing. The Component Warfare Concept provides
organizational structure which supports integration of information (data fusion) from all
sources. An architecture must be designed which will allow implementation of
automation for the data fusion and decision processing. Techniques for comparative
analysis must be identified, as well as measures of performance, to enhance selection of
the optimal design.
H. MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF C2
Command and control - The exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission. [REF 1 :p. 77]
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The ability to correlate raw data, build an assessment and form a response based
on interpretation and abstraction of the situation has always been a key to warfighting
success. In the days of Sun Tzu, the task could probably be carried out by a single
warrior. One man could assimilate and evaluate all of the available intelligence
information about the enemy, and form a response strategy. As the technology of war
changed, and the size of the arena, the task of managing the growing volume of
information demanded complex intelligence gathering and analysis staffs.
The modus operandi of the fighting man changed too, primarily in the role of
leadership. Centralized organization of large forces required more information to flow
out, from that point of control, to the forces. While in theory, commanders at the lowest
echelon are expected to make decisions and execute their appropriate mission, modern
history suggests that tactical decisions of any real importance are made at the highest
level (sometimes by the commander-in-chief) and communicated down to the lower
echelon for execution. While this may not be the most efficient method of command and
control (in terms of the delay in information relay up and down the chain of command,
and the inevitable distortion of detail and intent caused by filtering that naturally occurs
in the communication process), it has in recent history proven effective (in terms of
successful completion of the assigned missions, and as an "extension of politics", in clear
execution of foreign policy objectives of the President).
B. NAVAL THREAT ENVIRONMENT
The Navy, perhaps, is more sensitive to the degree of centralized command and
control, due to the nature of day to day operations. Far from the commander-in-chief
for extended periods of time, naval commanders are forced to operate with a certain
amount of tactical autonomy. This is not to say that the wheel is reinvented each time
a decision is made, since tactics are developed for numerous scenarios by eschelons
higher than the deploying commander prior to departure on a mission. Scenario
development is not all inclusive, however, and the deployed commander cannot call home
for assistance on every decision that does not match the template provided. The Navy,
as a general rule, regards the on-scene commander as the person able to make the best
tactical decision.
Warfare technology today places the carrier battle group commander in a precarious
position. On the one hand, he has far more information instantly available than ever
before, but the sophistication of the potential threat has at least kept pace. No longer is
he given the leisure of manually analyzing each piece of raw data, hypothesizing about
the capabilities and intentions of the enemy, and finally making a decision in response
to a threat. Tactics provide a substitute for information processing in a real time
environment. The decision maker simply has to look for predetermined clues as
indicators of designated threats. Upon detection of a threat, a predetermined response
is executed.
Threats come in a variety of forms, and while detected characteristics may not be
exclusive to a single target type, much can be determined when information from various
sources is fused. Subsurface threats can be generally characterized as slow, but covert.
Location becomes the key, since identification as a submarine is relatively straight-
forward, once the target is acquired. The surface target is generally slow, and overt.
The tactical threat is not in being boarded, but rather in the power projection capability
of the ship's weapons (lethality and range). The danger of an air target is generally in
the small size and high speed of the craft. Sensors must have revisit rates that are high
enough to "catch" the moving vehicle.
The commander must be attentive to all events which may require the intervention
of the battle group, but especially targets within his operating area. Typically the
number of surface and sub-surface vessels in that area would be less than 200. The
nature of such activity is slow with at most 5 command and control decisions per minute
required. With target state changing so slowly, only 5000 reports/minute would be
received. If this were the extent of the environment, the impact on data management
would be minimal. [REF 2:pp. 50-57]
Several scenarios have been hypothesized over the years in development of naval
tactics. The case which requires the most intense management of information is an all
out air/sub/surface battle between two carrier battle groups. Of critical interest in this
environment are air targets. Within a 500 mile radius, the battle group might encounter
1000 targets simultaneously. It would be required to process them in real time due to
the speed of each vehicle. Fifty command and control decisions might be required of the
commander in a minute. Because of the speed of the potential threats, up to 100,000
reports per minute might be required to accurately track, identify, and target the threats.
[REF 2:pp. 50-57]
The other naval battle environment is the low intensity conflict. It is characterized
as low in intensity, because of the lower level of power projection, and it generally
occurs in littoral waters rather than far out at sea. This results in the requirement to
manage a significant amount of collateral information, that while not pertinent to the
execution of the tactical mission, is paramount in the "extension of politics" strategy and
national security objectives.
Decision making in the environment of either a full scale war or the low intensity
conflict requires efficient decision processing. To enhance the fusion of information that
is available to the deployed commander, the Navy utilizes an organizational structure that
modularizes information processing by warfare areas.
C. COMPOSITE WARFARE CONCEPT
The simultaneous operation of naval forces in all media requires a command and
control structure designed to manage all levels of conflict in all environments. The
Composite Warfare Command structure was developed to meet this need. Warfare areas
are distinguished by the media in which they are carried out and type of mission. The
power projection mission of the Navy is accomplished using specially designated assets
to execute Amphibious Warfare (AMW), Naval Special Warfare (NSW), and Strike
Warfare (STW). These warfare missions are offensive in nature and generally beyond
the scope of this research. The three primary missions in sea control are Anti-Air
Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, and Anti-Surface Warfare.
1. Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)
The goal of Anti-Air Warfare is to destroy or neutralize enemy air platforms
including missiles. This is accomplished with fighters, anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air
missiles, anti-air missiles, and electronic countermeasures. Tactics cover the entire
spectrum, from operations in general war on the open ocean, to low intensity conflict
in littoral areas.
The layered employment of various platforms provides an outer defense
perimeter several hundred miles out from the battle group commander. The area defense
zone extends to the range of an anti-ship cruise missile, and the immediate vicinity of the
ship is the local defense zone. Each area has weapons and tactics designed for
employment should a threat reach it.
Support comes from shore facilities, as well as afloat, for indication and
warning, threat assessment, collection and distribution of air tracking and targeting
(critical for engagement planning and queuing of weapons systems) as well as battlefield
damage assessment. [REF l:pp. 29-31, REF 3:pp. 11 & 39-43]
2. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
The goal of ASW is to deny the enemy the use of his submarines. This is
accomplished in the forward area, near the enemy's shores, by our own attack
submarines. Along barriers, and for regional control, airborne ASW platforms operate
with the support of national systems. The battle group relies on its own platforms for
self-defense. These include, frigates, S-3 Viking ASW aircraft, LAMPS helicopters, and
submarines. Essential to this mission is the exchange of information on a high-capacity,
secure, jam resistant, unexploitable communications network. [REF l:pp. 29-31, REF
3:pp. 11 & 39-43]
3. Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW)
The traditional role of the surface vessel is to destroy or at least reduce
surface threats. This is achieved using anti-ship cruise missiles, naval gunfire, torpedoes,
and electronic countermeasures. [REF l:pp. 29-31, REF 3:pp. 11 & 39-43]
m. MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION IN C2
The battle group commander operates in a huge arena. Volumes of information are
fed to him from sources such as shore intelligence facilities, airborne and space
surveillance systems, local sensors within the battle group and sensors organic to his
command vessel. The area of interest to him and the kind of information desired
depends on the decisions he is attempting to answer at the moment.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Several problems must be addressed in an analysis of the environment in which the
battle group commander must make decisions. First, the available volume of data that
must be processed is huge. Processing must very quick in order to give the commander
enough time to make decisions. Second, data is arriving from many diverse and
geographically separate sources. The commander must have some means of associating
and correlating information from disparate sources to get a composite picture of the
situation he faces.
In spite of the fact that the concepts of data fusion has been around for years, the
results of formalizing its definition and taxonomy are a more recent product of the Data
Fusion Subpanel of the Joint Director of Laboratories Technology Panel for Command,
Control and Communications, which was established in 1984. The objective of the Data
Fusion Subpanel is to improve the coordination of individual Service Data Fusion
Research and Development programs through the exchange of technical information and
8
concepts, by initiating new multi-Service cooperative research programs and technology
demonstrations. [REF 4:p. 1]
The taxonomy of data fusion, Figure 1 , is a description of the very processes that
make up the nucleus of modern warfighting. It clearly is not an end to itself, but rather
the lubricant of real time response. It does not occur in only one place or time, but
rather throughout the process from acquisition to and including response, Figure 2.
B. INFORMATION IN THE TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT
Information can be categorized as organic or nonorganic. Generally, organic
information is obtained from sources integral to a platform. The raw data requires
processing on site to be useable. Nonorganic information is received from sources
detached from the platform. The data has been processed by another platform prior to
dissemination. Nonorganic information may assist in tactical decisions or it may provide
strategic direction to the commander.
Geopolitical and intelligence data is an example of nonorganic, which while
seemingly extraneous, plays an important role in setting the stage for an accurate
situation and threat assessment. This backdrop contributes to the mindset that leadership
develops upon entering the theater of operations. It is important that the background
information not lead to faulty conclusions in dealing with actual events in theater, but
rather support a contemplative analysis of possible scenarios which could occur.
Data most relevant for real time decision making is received from sources organic





































































CE « <u.J tLS > z ttZ** *• LU —
t- Z O _






















































































































































3 _i z UILU o CO












Ml CO o< zu











- O > -
I- _l H CO
z
> o
w i- i- b
z z -i o <










_|Z K O 0.




















CO O 2 = CE
z < _ CO -1 < O
LU
































































» u iw ©Z v»3
1 i bX^
DATA
































































GENERALIZED FUSION ENVIRONMENT [Source: REF 2:p. 62]
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subsurface targets (military and civilian), generates contact data from multiple sensors.
The information must be analyzed together to eliminate redundancy and to provide the
added value of multiple perspective sensors.
C. DATA FUSION
The problem of fusing target data is primarily one of managing speed. If the
decision maker had a long period of time to evaluate track data, the probability of
analysis error would be much smaller than in the environment of real time decision
making. A missile approaching in a covert mode will allow the decision maker very
little time to respond once acquisition occurs. The mathematical, statistical and
inferential processes that take place in data fusion are divided into three levels. At the
lowest most algorithmic level (LEVEL ONE) occur the manipulation of raw sensor data
and tracks. This includes adaptive signal processing resulting in detection, normalization
of data in terms of a three dimensional position and time (sometimes called alignment),
one of several methods to associate detections in order to perform tracking, employment
of one of several algorithms to correlate and fuse tracks from nonorganic sensors with
tracks from organic sensors, and target identification. [REF. 2:pp. 15-19]
LEVEL TWO (Situation Assessment) and LEVEL THREE (Threat Assessment)
require more reasoning and are hence less algorithmic. These are the decisions of
strategy and tactics of war. Throughout the centuries men have devised methods for
waging war that required knowledge of the enemy. From deception advocated by Sun
Tzu to maneuver as executed by German Panzer Divisions in North Africa, the decision
12
maker's knowledge of enemy movement and capabilities played a major role in
warfighting success. Assessment is not a purely mathematical process, but rather,
requires multiple perspective spatial views of the environment, and a doctrine to guide
establishment of goals or objectives. Fusion is not the focus in assessment, but the fused
product is critical in assessing the enemy. The decision maker at this level must evaluate
the composite picture, consider the mission or goals that are to be accomplished and
generate hypotheses for each target as well as for the whole force.
To support this decision-making, large databases must be maintained including
Threat Capabilities, Own Force Capabilities, Mission Goals, Strategic Intelligence,
Behavior-Doctrine of Enemy and Own Force, Terrain Mapping (applicable in a power
projection mission), and Airways Mapping. Quantitative estimation is performed along
with sensor and weapons modeling. Perspectives of and relationships between platforms
are analyzed resulting in a recommendation. [REF 2:pp. 263-291]
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IV. DATA FUSION - SENSORS AND PROCESSES
Data Fusion - a multi-level, multi-faceted process of dealing with the association,
correlation, and combination of data and information from multiple sources to
achieve refined position and identity estimation, and complete and timely
assessment of situations and threats as well as their significance. [Ref 5:p. 6]
The sources and characteristics of data result in distinguishing between positional
fusion and identity fusion. While many of the basic processes are the same, identity
fusion requires a larger knowledge base and inferential reasoning techniques. The scope
of this discussion is primarily on positional fusion.
A. POSITIONAL FUSION
Positional fusion deals with the kinematics of an object. Motion parameters, apart
from mass and force are managed in this context. This includes position in three
dimensions, motion vector (comprised of velocity, and bearing in three dimensional
coordinate system), and velocity or bearing changes. Some of this information is
received directly from sensors, while other parts of it must be derived. The challenge
of positional fusion is to match sensor inputs with each other and with existing tracks in
the database through mathematical and statistical manipulation of the raw data received
from the sensor.
1. Sensors - The Information Source
Modern war fighting is as integrally dependent on sensors as it is on the
weapons. The target must be located first using some kind of search mode. In order for
14
a track to be established and maintained, the sensor must continue providing updated
information at a rate high enough to ensure association ambiguity does not occur.
a. Sensor Types And Terms
Radar is the primary sensor for detection of targets on and above the
surface. The measurements that can be obtained when using radar are the actual return
or cross-section, and its transform in the frequency domain. This gives the user a
signature which may be compared to a database for identification. Range, azimuth and
elevation can be derived and in some cases target size and shape. From this and
subsequent measurements, the position, velocity, and heading of the target can be
determined.
Electronic intelligence (ELINT) receivers and electronic support measures
(ESM) equipment provide signal amplitude and frequency at a specific time. Associated
information are the signal to noise ratio, polarization, and pulse shape. Depending on
the characteristics of the specific signal received, derived information might include
target position, velocity, and identification. Characteristics of many EM emissions are
well documented resulting in high probability of identification when detected.
Electro-Optical systems gather picture elements, electronically
differentiating color and intensity. Although processing time is long compared to other
sensor types, size and shape from the color picture can make identification possible.
Infrared provides similar data to the electro-optical, but in a different
frequency range. Identification is possible, because information gathered can include
location, size, shape, temperature, and other spectral characteristics. Position and
15
velocity information are less determinant as they are generally dependent on the platform
operating the ER sensor.
Communications intelligence (COMINT) may seem an unlikely "sensor"
in this context, but it illustrates the complexity of fusing disparate data. In addition to
signal analysis which can provide valuable information about the identification and
location of the transmitting platform, the text of received conversations can reveal
additional intelligence critical in understanding the intentions and tactics of the enemy.
[REF 6:pp. 19-20]
To understand the strengths and weaknesses of each type of sensor it is
important to be familiar with the basics of sensor characteristics. A few of the more
important terms are defined in Table 1
.
Radar with millimeter wavelength has high detection probability good
ranging capability, but marginal angular resolution. It is not highly sensitive to weather
and provides a low technical risk sensor. Electro-Optical sensors are passive (good in
EMCON environment), high resolution and low technical risk, but they are limited by
a light source, have difficulty providing target range, and are highly sensitive to weather.
IR devices respond much better in inclement weather, and depending on the platform
from which they are operated, may provide ranging. Though only a moderate technical
risk and relatively undetectable, they must become active to provide target ranging.
b. Applications
In the air-air environment, the operator is intent on detection, tracking
and if and identifying other aircraft. This includes a determination of friend or foe
16
TABLE 1
SENSOR TERMINOLOGY DEFINED [Source: REF 2:pp. 19-20]
TERM DEFINITION
Spatial/Temporal Resolution Ability to distinguish between two or more
targets in space or time.
Spatial Coverage Spatial volume covered by the sensor, for
scanning sensors this may be described by the
instantaneous field-view, the scan pattern
volume and the total field-of-regard achievable
by moving the scan pattern.
Detection/Tracking Modes Search and tracking modes performed:
1. Staring or scanning.
2. Single or multiple target tracking.
3. Single or multimode (track-while-scan/stare).
Target Revisit Rate Rate at which a given target is revisited by the
sensor to perform a sample measurement.
(Staring sensors are continuous.)
Measurement Accuracy Accuracy of a sensor measurements in terms of
statistics.
Measurement Dimensionality Number of measurement variables (range,
range rate, and spectral features) between target
categories.
Hard/Soft Data Reporting Sensor outputs are provided either as hard-
decision (threshold) reports or as preprocessed
reports with quantitative measures of evidence
for possible decision hypothesis.
Detection/Track Reporting Sensor reports each individual target detection
or maintains a time-sequence representation
(track) of the target's behavior.
Detection Performance Detection characteristics (false alarm rate,
detection probability, and ranges) for a
calibrated target characteristic in a given noise
background.
False Alarm Rate Rate at which a detection is made in error.
Miss Rate Rate at which sensor failed to make a detection.
Detection Probability Probability of making a correct detection (sum
of false alarm rate, miss rate, and detection
probability rate is one).
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possible aircraft type. To accomplish this sensor employment includes multi-mode radar
(including IFF), infrared, electro-optical, and ESM.
For the ground attack mission, the goal is to search, acquire and identify
hostile ground targets. Engagement and weapons control and damage assessment follow.
Important to this mission are terrain-following radar, imaging/mapping radar, infrared
detection, electronic support measures, and electronic countermeasures, and electronic
counter-countermeasures
.
The surface vessel is concerned about the air threat, and in its defense
conducts surveillance for air traffic control, hostile target detection and identification.
Tracking and engagement of hostile air threats follows. Air search radar (including IFF),
fire control radar, electronic support measures and infrared detection are used to
accomplish this mission.
The surface and sub-surface threat to the surface force requires
surveillance of both media for detection and identification of targets. Support is also
required to coordinate engagements between own force and the hostile. Typically
employed are surface search radar, hull-mounted sonar, towed-array sonar, and electronic
support measures.
In most of the threat scenarios, Airborne Warning And Control
(AWACS) supports own forces with surveillance, detection and tracking, air traffic




Alignment occurs first and is normalization of contact data or tracks to a
common time and space reference. Next the target data must be associated with other
target data being received and with track data already identified in the database.
Tracking describes initiating, updating or deleting a track in the database. Initiation
occurs when a contact is deemed to be a new object. An ID is assigned and a history
file started. Update is a generic term to describe any one of many algorithms which
statistically determine what effect new data has on an existing track, and mathematically
append the history file to reflect the change. Deletion takes place when a track is no
longer determined to be likely (statistically speaking).
a. Alignment
Processing of raw sensor data to achieve a common time base, a common spatial
reference, common units, etc., as necessary to properly normalize the data for
subsequent processing. [REF 5:p. 1]
The first thing that must occur when a report is received, is
normalization. To compare target reports with each other, regardless of the source of
the raw data, they must be in the same time-space coordinate system. For organic sensor
data, only the time associated information must be altered, as the position reference for
the sensors is the same. This will require a mathematical manipulation of the position
of the target based on kinematic features like bearing and velocity. For non-organic
data, both the time of the report and the location of the original sensor must be
considered in the process. [REFS 2 and 7]
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b. Association
The definition and calculation of a closeness metric on which the assignment of
sensor data items to entities will be decided. The process of generating, scoring,
and deciding on hypotheses about the question of which detection or measurements
under consideration refer to the same object (come from the same target and should
be associated) and which refer to different objects. [REF 5:p. 2]
Association employs mathematical and probabilistic algorithms for
hypothesis testing. In its simplest form target track data is received from a shipboard
radar, and must be matched with target track data existing in a database maintained on
the same vessel. Important elements in the comparison are position, position accuracy,
velocity, velocity accuracy, current bearing, and update time. Accuracy is a probabilistic
value designated to each sensor. The received position must be evaluated against other
positions on file to determine if it is a false alarm, existing target, or new target. In a
low volume scenario, the new target data could be compared against every element of
target data on file in a search for best fit. As a combinatorial problem, however, the
amount of processing grows immensely in a target rich environment. To reduce the
number of evaluations that must be processed at that degree of accuracy, a hierarchical
process of elimination is used called gating. A gate test might be designed to compare
just the velocity of a target. If the difference between the new target velocity and the
velocity of a target in the database is greater than a specified threshold, then that target
in the database is not further considered as a candidate for association with the new data.
The same kind of gating is also done with position and bearing. Similar processes are
used to reach association decisions with ESM, IR, and Electro-Optical data.
20
In the classical approach, Figure 3, association and estimation are
separate and distinct processes. Kinematic data is first aligned as described above. The
association process then pairs the actual data element with predicted (estimated) data
elements from the database. The number of pairs is minimized by gating the kinematic
data from the database, allowing only reasonable data to be used to form association
hypotheses. The pairwise associated hypotheses are scored based on statistical distance
between the actual and estimated pieces of data. These statistics might be probabilities
of target existence, track length, or track sequence. If prior knowledge is available about
any of the hypotheses, an a posteriori probability can be computed. The recursive
process of generating and scoring the hypotheses will end with one (hard association
decision) or more (soft association decision) hypotheses rewritten to the database. A
track ID must be assigned to each hypothesis. In the classical model, the current target
kinematics and an estimate of its future is written to the database as part of the track.
The estimator uses the prior knowledge about the target based on the track dynamics and
forms a model to estimate the kinematics for the next interval at which gating and
association is expected to occur.
An adaptive approach to the association and estimation process, Figure
4, has been designed to more tightly integrate the two functions. Alignment occurs in
the same manner, but selection of candidate tracks for association is made immediately
based on distance criteria between the old target information and the new piece of data.
Estimation is done on only those selected candidates aligning them in time to the new


























number of association hypotheses. Hypothesis generation and scoring occurs in the same
manner as the classical approach and after ensuring a track ID is assigned to each track,
they are written to the database. Estimates of future kinematics are not maintained in the
track database due to processing time and storage space constraints. The important
ingredient in command and control, future prediction, is managed at the next level,
situation assessment.
Complexity is induced when data is not from organic sensors. Questions
of design arise which must be resolve. Is the information received raw or preprocessed
data? If raw data, how is accuracy determined with respect to organic sensor data? If
preprocessed, is there enough track information to make an accurate evaluation against
existing data? Should it be evaluated against processed data only, or can it be compared
with other raw data? Ultimately, association with an existing target in the database
allows maintenance of a target history and estimation of future target position and
kinematics. This is critical in target tracking. [REFS 2 and 7]
c. Tracking
Precise and continuous position-finding of targets by radar, optical, or other
means. [REF 1: p. 374]
The computational process dealing with the estimation of an object's true
position based on noisy observations (measurements) of it. Tracking may consist
of filtering (estimating the position at the time of the latest observation), smoothing
(estimating the position at a point in the past), and prediction (estimating the
position at a point in the future). [REF 5:p. 13]
As comparisons are made between each data element, hypotheses for a
match are generated. The probability of each hypothesis being correct is calculated and
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the tracks are updated based on the algorithm in use. If a soft decision approach is being
used, several tracks may be updated for a period of time, until the system can determine
which one is the correct track. The subject of multiple target tracking has been
thoroughly researched and provides much of the foundation on which the mathematical
processing is done for data fusion. While it may seem that solving the problem of
tracking is synonymous to solving the problem of data fusion, it is not the case. In its
simplest form, a target tracker is receiving sensor data from one source, like a radar.
At each sweep, new information is received by the tracker. This must be evaluated
against information received during the last sweep to determine if returns from different
positions imply a moving target, or a new stationary target. The problem of tracking
employs one or more of several mathematical processes or models. These include the
Kahlman filter, probabilistic data association (PDA) and joint probabilistic data
association (JPDA). [REF 8]
B. IDENTITY FUSION
Target recognition is categorized as identity fusion rather than positional fusion.
Methods employed to accomplish this fall into three categories: physical models,
parametric classification, and cognitive-based models.
In some cases, the identity of the target can be determined from analysis of
electronic emissions. This requires a knowledge base of target characteristics including
a template or inference modeling capability. When the signal of a radar, known to be
employed on a specific type of aircraft, is received from an object, and other sensor
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inputs support the hypothesis (object airborne operating at a velocity within specified
tolerance), the system can proceed, designating the target as that specified aircraft type.
The knowledge base on that aircraft type will also provide the decision maker additional
information about its threat capability.
Targets operating in more stealthy modes emit fewer obvious clues requiring the
decision maker to analyze input from multiple sources. Sensors geographically separated
can give two additional information features: earlier acquisition time due to proximity
of sensor and a larger backscatter cross-section due to location of sensor relative to target
track. A missile approaching the sensor platform directly will have a small cross-section,
making it difficult to acquire until it either begins emitting a homing signal or gets too
close. A sensor platform that is not along the flight path of the missile might be able to
acquire and identify quickly, and relay the data to the first platform. Fusion allows the
data from the geographically separated sensors to be merged, permitting earlier
identification of the threat. [REF 2:pp. 214-217]
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V. ARCHITECTURAL ALTERNATIVES
Pure centralized and distributed approaches to solving the problem of track
management represent the endpoints of architectural design in the context of this
discussion. A pure centralized system would receive data from all sensor platforms and
process it at one site, sending the results back to the decision makers. At the opposite
end of the spectrum, a distributed system would require the platforms to process all data
which would be broadcast over a communications network. With this data each platform
would build a situation assessment. Along the line between the extremes lie numerous
hybrid approaches. A hybrid design utilizes both centralized and distributed processes
in the system solution. Four designs are discussed in this research, the endpoints and
two hybrid representations. They are not meant to be the final word on fusion system
design, but rather to provide a platform for discussion of the architectural features which
make design difficult. The four designs will provide a forum for a discussion of
performance evaluation using the Analytic Hierarchy Process.
A. CENTRALIZED DESIGN
The central fusion processor, Figure 5, receives sensor data (contacts) from all
sources and executes the fusion process as described in the previous section. Fused
tracks are assigned an ID and maintained in a central database. The added value
provided by multiple sensor contacts and multiple target perspectives makes the fused
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a single point. Situation and threat assessment is done at the battle group level
incorporating the track data from the central database, as well as warfare doctrine, other
intelligence information, and mission requirements (orders). The battle group decision
maker interacts with the information, in the development of a composite tactical picture
of his environment. This single composite picture is made up of targets being tracked
by all platforms and assessments by the battle group. It is maintained in real time at the
battle group level and broadcast to decision makers at all levels. Access to the raw
sensor data at the platform level for command and control is denied.
B. DISTRIBUTED DESIGN
In the distributed approach, Figure 6, fusion is accomplished at the local platform
level. Fusion occurs in the same fashion as described before, and the databases
described in the central approach are the same, but they are maintained on each platform.
Locally fused tracks are broadcast to all other platforms providing the added value of
multiple perspective sensor data. Situation and threat assessment are performed at the
local level in an automated process and relayed to the battle group commander for
information. Since all platforms have the same sensor data available to them (except for
minute differences in time of receipt of the data), and fusion processing occurs using the
same algorithms, the resulting assessments are fundamentally identical for each platform
decision maker. (This assumes that the assessment processes are automated. When
human decision makers are doing assessments, they will be different in spite of identical
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updates to the doctrine, intelligence and operational orders. Real time target data
management is enhanced, because while delays may occur in the broadcast of nonorganic
data, the delay for processing organic detections is minute.
With respect to track ID numbers at the local level, tracks will have an ID's
assigned at the local platform regardless of the source of the data. When track data is
shared between platforms, ID's are ignored, because the fusion process that will occur
on the receiving platform is only concerned with the kinematic and identity information
in the track. Once association has been accomplished, that new track data will become
part of an existing track or it will be assigned a new track number by the receiving
platform. The battle group will manage track ID's in much the same fashion. Data
management between platforms will take place apart from ID numbers.
C. HYBRID DESIGN (ONE)
Two hybrid models are considered. The first approach, Figure 7, closely
resembles the quasi-manual system currently in use. Organic sensor data is processed
and fused on the platform and a database of tracks is maintained locally. Information is
passed between platforms and from other nonorganic sources in the form of tracks.
These are fused with tracks in the local database using the same general fusion processes
(manually executed for the most part). The responsibility of managing track ED's
between platforms is accomplished by the assignment of blocks of numbers to each
platform and the battle group level. If another platform has information that will add
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"HYBRID ONE" FUSION ARCHITECTURE
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ID numbers and shares the data with other platforms and with the battle group level.
The picture provided by the organic sensors and the shared data is used by local decision
makers for tactical operations and assessments. Not only are the tracks shared in this
architecture, but assessments as well. Functionally, for example, one of the platforms
might have equipment which enhances its ability to process underwater targets. The
tracks and assessments provide useful information to all platforms. The battle group
decision maker accomplishes his own fusion, (a step which would be redundant if the
processes were automated on all platforms), and analyzes it further for a higher level
assessment.
D. HYBRID DESIGN (TWO)
The second hybrid approach, Figure 8, requires fusion at the local level, but
situation and threat assessment at the battle group level. Multiple sensor contacts are
received simultaneously and pairwise compared generating statistically scored hypotheses.
The resulting tracks are forwarded to the battle group level for further processing. As
multiple platforms operating in the same region forward track reports to the battle group
fusion center, the tracks are pairwise compared, the hypotheses are statistically scored,
and the fused tracks are assigned ID's. The fusion process at this level also requires
comparison with tracks existing in the battle group database which were received
previously from the platforms, or received from sources external to the battle group.
The fused tracks with ID's assigned by the battle group fusion system are returned to the
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"HYBRID TWO" FUSION ARCHITECTURE
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basis for decision making by all platform decision makers and by the battle group
decision maker. The primary distinguishing feature of this architecture is in the
minimization of required processing at the local level. Situation and threat assessment
are done only at the battle group level because, in an automated system they require large
databases and processing power. Replicating these processes on all platforms would be
costly in terms of initial investment and maintenance.
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VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
An comparison of the alternative architectures requires a discussion of design
tradeoffs and performance evaluation. Many aspects of design could be mentioned, but
most fall outside the focus of this research. The discussion of tradeoffs takes a more
general look at the four designs previously described identifying strengths and
weaknesses, but making no attempt to quantify them. The performance evaluation will
attempt to identify measures of performance for a quantitative comparison of the designs.
The Analytic Hierarchy Process will be employed, to demonstrate how alternative
architectures could be compared.
A. DESIGN TRADEOFFS
Tradeoffs exist between the architectural concepts described here. The centralized
fusion approach insures that no redundancy occurs in data management. No chance is
given for duplication of track ID's between platforms. All decision makers are looking
at the same tactical picture, and the same situation and threat assessment. On the other
hand, the interval between detection and situation assessment is increased by propagation
delay in data exchange resulting from the geographical separation of the two processes.
While this may not affect routine intelligence analysis, the delay of a real time response
to an missile threat could be fatal.
Distributing the processes insures a very short interval between local detection and
situation assessment. It gives the local decision maker complete control over data from
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his organic sensors, but allows the added value of nonorganic data to be considered.
This insures the decision maker has the most accurate track data available, a critical
aspect of responding to a real time threat. Track ID' s are controlled at the local level
where they are most often utilized. This guarantees cognitive continuity in the decision
making process at the local level. The number of a track does not change every time its
accuracy is updated, and the ID is not constantly reused for different targets.
Communications between platforms about a target become more complex, however, since
no one uses the same ID number for a specified track. Decision makers would have to
be trained that their track numbers are unique to their platform, and that discussion of
track numbers between platforms will result in ambiguity.
The first hybrid approach to the problem resembles the current status of fusion in
the level of manual processing that occurs. Organic sensor data is fused locally and track
ID's are assigned. Situation and threat assessment are accomplished on site also ensuring
accurate timely decision making. Both assessments and tracks are shared between
platforms to provide added value to the tactical picture of each decision maker. While
organic sensor data is fused automatically, anything that is received from another source
must be manually evaluated and fused. The advantages of local processing as discussed
in the distributed architecture apply here also. The problem of information sharing is
somewhat mitigated by the assignment of blocks of track numbers to platforms (in that
no ID will be duplicated), and the role of the battle group fusion processor in resolving
ID conflict
. This, however, does not account for the problem of cognitive management
of the data. More pronounced due to the manual nature of the processing is the problem
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of changing ID's that will occur when information is shared on the network. For
example, the target designated #123 might become #128 when the battle group
information manager determines that the target is being tracked by more than one
platform. In the manual manipulation of data, the decision maker who is under the stress
of battle will not be able to keep up with constantly changing ID's.
The technology of the threat has put manual processes at great risk of failure.
Automated management of information sharing is essential to future success. The final
hybrid architecture is designed to account for these changes in technology. Fusion of
organic sensor data and nonorganic track data is accomplished at the local level. This
information is available locally to manage real time decisions when this is necessary.
For the most part, however, situation and threat assessment takes place at the Battle
Group level after fusion of multiple platform track data occurs. This enhances the
accuracy of the tactical picture and the assessment. The platform has the advantage of
using real time organic sensor data for tracking the incoming missile threat, but the depth
and breadth of a complete analysis of the unidentifiable contact. Track ED's in the shared
picture are managed by the battle group fusion system to insure interoperabibty. The
shared picture becomes the primary reference for command and control, to allow early
prevention of enemy action that might lead to the need for use of the local platform
database. If targets get through the warning and assessment net of the battle group
command and control system local platforms will have to act autonomously, and this
architecture gives them the tools to do so. No time will be available for information
sharing until the immediate conflict is resolved.
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B. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
Measures of performance (MOP) in this context are attributes that measures the
performance of the system in an operational environment. Measures of performance
could be evaluated in a variety of frameworks and still avoid the key research issues of
this thesis, so parameters which directly affect the Track ID management in the
centralized, distributed, and hybrid architectures must be identified.
1. Measures Of Performance
The author examined the architectures, evaluated the expectations of a
performance evaluation and selected the MOP's identified in Table 2. The intent of the
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Technical characteristics are attributes which describe the capabilities of the
system, rather than individual sensors. The issue of accuracy is almost a moot point, but
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it must be discussed to set the stage for the other MOP's. While raw data accuracy is
sensor dependent, the degree of accuracy increases as multiple sensors are brought to
bear on a single target. Whether the focus is on positional accuracy, or on identity,
more information is better in most cases. In all of the architectures defined above, fusion
occurs at some level. In the case of the centralized approach, all contacts are processed
at a single point providing the highest degree of accuracy. If fusion is done in a
hierarchical fashion, error can be induced at each level, and while the final product may
still be better than a single report, it is not as good as it could have been.
The key issue to managing real time fusion is timeliness. Delay can occur
both in processing and in data relay between platforms. The fusion of large volumes of
raw data, as in the centralized architecture, will result in greater delay than fusion of
processed data in the form of tracks. The assignment of track ID 's at a single location
can result in delay. Relaying of data between geographically separate platforms always
results in delay.
Ambiguity in any form is detrimental to command and control in war. The
architecture employed will provide varying degrees of ED clarity in track management.
Single ID used for more than one target, single target labeled with more than one ID and
constantly changing BD's describe ambiguity in this environment.
Reliability, while not the primary focus of this research, must be considered
in the design of a fusion system. An architecture that is unusable when communications
are degraded, or EMCON conditions are mandated is less reliable than a system that can
operate autonomously.
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The second major category is the cognitive interface. While this research has
not focused on human factors, the degree of cognitive interface with the track
management process will be different in each architecture. It is the opinion of this author
that the human is the weakest link in the real time management of target tracks. That
being the case, the degree to which the decision maker must participate in the fusion and
response process will greatly affect the performance of the system.
Cost of design is discussed in terms of processing equipment and secure high
bandwidth communications hardware. If processing is done at a single site, the cost of
processing hardware is reduced, but the cost of communications hardware increases.
Fusion in a distributed environment requires multiple processors and communications
equipment. Economies of scale may apply for hardware acquisition, but since all of the
architectures require multiple components of either computer equipment or
communications equipment, scale would not be a deciding factor. Hybrid architectures
require large numbers of components of both kinds, but some savings may be made in
processing equipment if Level Two and Three processing is not executed on all
platforms.
2. Architectural Comparisons
The tradeoffs occur in implementation. The centralized architecture will
provide highly accurate tracks. No error will be induced through repeated fusion. While
processing delay will be relatively short (because all processes are executed only once),
there will be a delay in the transfer of data between the platforms and the battle group
fusion center. Since this architecture restricts local access to the raw data, the delay
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could be fatal if the platform was unable to react in a timely fashion to a real time threat.
ID clarity receives high marks because all ID's are assigned at a single point. Associated
with this, the cognitive participation of the human decision maker is low, enhancing the
performance of the system. On the other hand, this may be an additional cause of delay
since the platform cannot respond to any threat until the central fusion processor has
received, processed, and returned the track information. Reliability is impacted
negatively as a result of the communications essential design. With respect to
affordability, this design requires the least in terms of processing equipment, but relies
heavily on high speed communications hardware.
The distributed architecture ensures that tracks are accurate through fused
tracks from the battle group center. Timeliness is impacted only with respect to the
receipt of track information from nonorganic sources. There is a clear tradeoff between
accuracy and timeliness in this architecture. On the other hand, each platform has fused
tracks on site from organic sensors allowing it to respond to the real time threat. Clarity
is managed through autonomy. While track numbers cannot be shared between
platforms, the fused picture that each decision maker maintains should be fundamentally
identical. Ambiguity may exist where platforms are operating close together in a high
threat environment, if decision makers try to communicate about targets using track ID
numbers. The human decision maker cognitive participation is greater in this
environment with respect to interoperability with other platforms. As to affordability,
processing equipment is required on each platform as well as communications hardware.
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The system is more reliable. Even if communications are degraded, platforms have the
ability to detect, track, assess, and respond to a threat.
The current manual system, described in the first hybrid design, must be
compared on a different level. While the fact exists that fused tracks are more accurate,
manual processing induces error and bias resulting in a track which may not be as
accurate as the raw data. Compounding the problem is the inherent delays in the manual
system. Error may be induced simply because track data received from other sources
is old. Ambiguity is of key concern when manual processes are in place. Failure of the
battle group level to manually detect a conflict will result in confusion at all levels.
Cognitive processing occurs throughout the system impacting accuracy, timeliness, and
ambiguity. Reliability and affordability are associated again, in that while the system is
the most affordable (utilizing lower speed communications hardware, and manual
processing), is the least reliable.
The second hybrid design attempts to provide a realistic solution, in terms of
both cost and reliability. The local platform has the ability to respond in a timely
manner to a real time threat, as well as utilize the added value of fused data. Control
of ID conflict is managed by the battle group level reducing ambiguity while allowing
autonomous operation when necessary. Cognitive processing requirements are reduced
at the local platform level, and centralized at the battle group level. Data processing is
reduced at the local level by moving all situation and threat assessment to the battle
group level. The communications requirement for track management is full duplex, but
assessment distribution is simplex or broadcast, making the design more affordable. The
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reliability factor limits the ability to access fused tracks from other sources when
communications are degraded. The platform will be forced to rely on data from organic
sensors. While this level of autonomy may not be desireable, tactical operations can still
continue with the processing equipment located on each platform.
C. ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS
The Analytic Hierarchy Process is a decision tool which allows the user to structure
problems into a hierarchy of interrelated decision elements. At the highest level is the
single goal or objective the user is trying to reach. The user is attempting to make a
comparison or selection of alternatives. Below the macro decision objective fall criteria
that are used to evaluate each alternative. Each attribute is given a weight for importance
or likelihood. Sub-attributes can be specified at a lower level with weights for each. At
the bottom of the hierarchy each alternative is listed and a value is assigned which
indicates how that alternative measures up to each attribute. The evaluation is somewhat
subjective in nature, as a natural consequence of the fuzziness of the problem. The tool
provides a means for assigning quantitative measures to problems that are not well
defined. [REF. 9:pp. 96-101]
In the case of architectural comparisons as described in this research, a designer
might use the following techniques to determine which is the optimal architecture.
Measures of performance must first be identified, and their fit in each design evaluated.
The next step is to structure the problem in a hierarchical fashion and assign weights to
each attribute. In all of the steps where weights are determined, absolute values can be
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assigned or pairwise comparisons can be made between each of the alternatives resulting
in relative weight values. The final step in the process is obtaining values for each
attribute, measured for each architecture. These values might be subjective in the case
of the cognitive requirements of the system, but cost and technical characteristics are
quantitative values. Accuracy, for example, must be measured for each system and the
results normalized to 1.00. For this illustration the values were all subjectively assigned
by the author.
Figure 9 represents the structure of the problem, including the weights assigned to
each attribute and the values "obtained" from each architecture. On the first level of
attributes, cost was determined to be of lesser interest than the other two criteria.
Technical characteristics were closely evaluated against the cognitive requirements of the
system. The author judged that since the technical design drives the cognitive interface,
its weight should be slightly higher. At the second level technical characteristics were
broken down into accuracy, timeliness, ambiguity and reliability . The level of ambiguity
was considered to be most important of these criteria. Accuracy and timeliness followed
in that order. The accuracy attribute was judged to be more important because it was
the focus of data fusion, while timeliness measured how quickly accurate information
could be generated. The reliability factor was given the lowest value, because as a
measure of how well the system would function under stress, it was considered of
secondary importance in this evaluation.
For this illustration the measurement values for each architecture were assigned on
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expensive, as indicated by the high value assigned. A Distributed architecture, assigned
the lowest value, was judged to be the most costly. The Centralized and Hybrid Two
systems were considered to require low cognitive interaction, while the Distributed and
Hybrid One demanded slightly higher interaction. The values assigned for the technical
attributes follow the vein of the earlier discussion. The Centralized system is highly
accurate and insures low ambiguity, but is less timely and not very reliable. The
Distributed system is timely, reliable, and relatively accurate, but results in a greater
amount of ambiguity. The Hybrid One design is low in all categories except reliability.
The Hybrid Two architecture was assigned values for each attribute which placed it
between the extremes.
Understanding that no particular solution was sought by the author, sensitivity
analysis in this illustration provides some interesting insights into the attribute weight
assignment process. Figures 10-12 are sensitivity plots for goal change with respect to
each of the first level attributes. With the exception of the Cost attribute, Figure 10, the
data ("measured" values) make a strong case for the Centralized architecture.
To illustrate the interactive analysis process, the author made changes to the
weights in an attempt to change the "optimal" architecture. Since the weights must be
normalized to 1.00, no single attribute can be changed. Modifications must be made to
two or three of the attribute weights. The author reevaluated the systems holding the
weight of each attribute fixed and changing the other two. With Cost fixed at .250,
Cognitive and Technical Characteristics weight were altered in both directions, but there
was no change in the selection of an optimal architecture. Fixing Cognitive requirements
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SENSITIVITY PLOT FOR TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS
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at .350, the optimal architecture changed to Hybrid Two by reducing the weight of the
Cost factor to .032 and increasing Technical Characteristics to .618. When the weight
of the Technical Characteristics attribute is fixed at .400, Cost weighting needs only
increase to .370 and Cognitive to .230 to change the optimal architecture to the Hybrid
One.
This is an illustration of the process which must be used to evaluate architectural
tradeoffs and select an optimal design. For an actual evaluation, the number and
specificity of performance criteria should be increased. A more thorough analysis of the
weights assigned to each decision element should be undertaken, and actual
measurements would be used for each architecture.
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Vn. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The author has described some of the problems associated with managing large
volumes of sensor data for command and control. Data Fusion processes provide the
tools for enhancing the accuracy of sensor information and assessments of the
environment. Ambiguity in decision making remains the key problem which must be
addressed. The process for building an architecture for C 2 Information Management
using fusion has been described. Crucial in the process is identification of measures of
performance and comparative analysis of architectural designs. The author illustrated a
method for this evaluation using the Analytic Hierarchy Process.
While this research suggests that a centralized architecture will provide the most
accurate, least ambiguous, and lowest cost design for data fusion, it is clear that the
result is dependent on the "measured" values assigned to each architecture. Actual
measurements must be obtained for a more conclusive decision. Since command and
control increasingly requires knowledge of events far beyond the immediate operational
theater, an evaluation should also include factors critical to the strategic decision making
process.
The problem of managing track numbers will not go away. With greater
information sharing it will become even more critical. To support information exchange
to this degree and minimize track management ambiguity, a distributed fully inter-
connected network of fusion centers should be designed. Shore and afloat facilities will
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provide the decision maker access to vital information outside his immediate purview
while giving him complete control of information processing in the immediate vicinity.
A virtual network with multiple protocol layers would allow the raw data to be accessed
by any node on the network. At the same time, a higher layer could provide fused
estimates of position and identity accessible to echelons who are either incapable of doing
their own fusion or desire only the "big picture" . The fully inter-connected environment
minimizes, the problem of track ED management through system and interface
standardization and process automation.
Modern warfare demands employment of technologically advanced weapons.
Strategic in their success is information management. This can only be accomplished
with faster and better decision processing, the elimination of unnecessary redundancy,
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